Global inequality in the mid-19
th century
In the spring of 1848, as the pan-European revolution was nearing its crescendo, Karl
Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote probably the best known political pamphlet of all time: The Communist Manifesto. When they surveyed the situation of the world, they persuasively and repeatedly insisted on the fact that people in all -civilized‖ societies were divided into two large classes: that of the owners of the means of production (the capitalists), and those that were selling their labor for a living and held no property (the proletarians). It was an almost selfevident division at the level of each and every country. Having capital meant being rich; having only labor power meant being poor. There were not too many people in-between, with middling levels of income, whether those who owned some capital and yet had to work with their hands like artisans, or peasants who toiled their own land. Moreover, even they-the logic of capitalist development was implacable-were doomed to extinction or irrelevance, as they would gradually -dissolve‖ mostly into proletariat with perhaps only a few making it to the capitalist class. The division into two or three main classes (the third being landowners, who in Marx and Engels' view could be assimilated to capitalists) was not, of course, introduced by Marx and Engels. It has been present in contemporary political economy, and it hailed back to Adam Smith, and even to François Quesnay. It was used by David Ricardo in his Principles, published in 1817, as a key feature, motivating his entire economic analysis.
So evident seemed the class division in all societies that Marx and Engels concluded their
Manifesto by writing that -…modern industrial labor, modern subjection to capital, the same in England as in France, in America and in Germany, has stripped [the proletarian] of every trace of national character‖ (1978, p. 482) . Being proletarian was thus a global condition, they held, and being global, it presented an ideal basis on which international solidarity of the working class could be built. Proletarians were equally poor and exploited everywhere and they could liberate themselves and usher in classless societies only in a common effort that knew no national borders. This was expressed in Marx and Engels' famous statements ‖ [t] he proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win‖ (ibid, p. 500). Local emancipation and international solidarity were thus intertwined, part of the same struggle.
This same view of workers who have no true homeland because they are everywhere equally destitute and powerless was reflected, only a year earlier, in a speech delivered to the 3 Free Trade Congress in Brussels by Engels. He defended his and Marx´s pro-free trade stance as follows:
Under freedom of trade the whole severity of the laws of political economy will be applied to the working classes. Is this to say that we are against Free Trade? No, we are for Free Trade, because by Free Trade all economical laws, with their most astounding contradictions will act upon a larger scale, upon a greater extent of territory, upon the territory of the whole earth; and because from the uniting of all these contradictions…will result the struggle which will itself eventuate in the emancipation of the proletariat. Engels believed that by letting capitalist rules of the game embrace ever greater portions of the globe, the outcome of such a capitalist domination would be similarity of economic conditions among workers. The similarity in economic conditions would, in turn, lead to the concordance of economic interests and to the emergence of solidarity among workers of different countries. Ultimately, it would culminate in a worldwide revolution.
But did similarity of economic conditions among workers exist then? Did Marx and Engels depict the reality of that era correctly? Today we have more data than Marx and Engels possessed at the time. Yet, their insight is confirmed by what we know today, both as regards the ubiquitous split between the two major classes and similarity in the economic position of the laborers, or, more broadly, the poor across countries.
Consider class and income compositions of a couple of societies for which we have the data from the mid-19 th century. In R.D. Baxter 's social table for England and Wales for 1867,   3 incomes of the wage-earning classes, representing 72 percent of the population and divided into eight subgroups, start at the bottom of the distribution, just above paupers, with an estimated per capita income equal to one-third of the national mean, and end at the richest point, with an income 10 percent below the mean. The propertied classes (a little over 6 percent of the population) covered the upper part of the income distribution. The income ratio between the two classes was greater than six to one.
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England was the prototypical and the most advanced capitalist economy. But we have the data for Chile in 1861 which reveal the same, or even sharper, polarization. 4 Working classes, from the poorest (female fisherman) to the richest (shoe-makers), covered the range of income that goes from less than one-seventh of the national mean to two-thirds of the mean. Only the artisans, who mixed ownership of some capital with their own labor, and possibly even hired a few workers, achieved an income higher than the national average. At the high end of the income distribution were owners of manufactures and mines with incomes between 20 and 55 times the mean, and land owners and large-scale merchants with respectively 35 and 9 times the mean.
These top groups comprised only 2 percent of the population while working classes (including peasants) accounted for more than 90 percent.
But if workers filled in most (or perhaps in all) countries, that part of the income pyramid which ran from the subsistence to just somewhat under the mean, their real incomes in various countries could still have differed a lot if country means were very different. But, as we shall see, around the 1850s, they were not. Angus Maddison has estimated that around 1850, the mean income in the poorest countries in the world (Ceylon and China) was around $PPP 600.
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At the top were the Netherlands and the United Kingdom with a GDP per capita of about $PPP 2,300. Thus, the ratio between the top and the bottom (of country mean incomes) was less than 4 to 1. Consequently, the better-off workers who earned incomes close to the national means, could not, in terms of their standard of living, differ from each other by more than the ratio of 4 to 1. And the bulk of workers who lived at less than their countries' average income and closer to the subsistence, could not have incomes that differed by more than 2 to 1-with many of them living at approximately the same subsistence level. Indeed, Broadberry and Gupta (2006, Table 6, p. 17) show that in the period 1800-1849, the wheat-wage of an unskilled daily laborer in India (among the poorest countries in the world then) was about 30% of the wage of a similar worker If we use the same decomposition between location and class today, when our data are much better than for the past, we find that of the global Gini, which amounts to 65.4 points, 56.2
Gini points or 85 percent is due to differences in mean country incomes, and only 9.2 Gini points (15 percent) to -class‖. 8 Not only is the overall inequality between world citizens greater in the early 21 st century than it was more than a century and a half ago, but its composition has entirely changed; from being an inequality determined in equal measures by class and location, it has become preponderantly an inequality determined by location only. This fact is of great political and economic significance. Note: Based on national household surveys; people ranked by per capita income or per capita consumption adjusted for price differences between the countries using the most recent PPPs. BRIC is an acronym denoting the emerging market economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China.
The figure could be made both more dramatic or less dramatic without losing anything of its essential message: namely, that most of global income differences today depend on location. We can make the figure more dramatic by contrasting incomes of people living in a 10 Note that if class alone determined one's global income position, and all country means were the same, the line for every country would be a straight 45 degree line. In other words, if we lined up all individuals from these countries by their per capita income, Denmark's income distribution would only start at the point at which many African countries' distributions end. The richest Malians are poorer than the poorest Danes.
The picture of global location-induced inequality could be also rendered a bit less dramatic, if we present it in a more finely-grained form, viz., if instead of using ventiles on the horizontal axis, we used percentiles of national income distributions, or even individuals lined up and ranked one by one. For sure, we should then be able to find some Malians who are richer than some Danes, and the two distributions would indeed display some overlap. However, that overlap would be, in a statistical sense, minimal: there may be one-half of a percept or 1 percent or even 2 or 3 percent of Malians who are richer than the poorest Danes, but this does not in any way invalidate the main message from our graph. In effect, when we contrast US and India, and instead of ventiles divide their populations into percentiles, the overlap is only 4 percent: that many Indians are better off than the poorest Americans (see Figure 2b ). Note: Based on national household surveys; adjusted for price differences between the countries using most recent PPPs.
The income gap between countries' average incomes is much greater today than around 1850. Again, using Maddison's data, in order to keep comparability with the 1850 results, we find that the top-to-bottom ratio in 2007 was in excess of 100 to 1 (as opposed to 4 to 1 that it was in 1850). The increase in the gap is easy to understand: while the poorest countries today are Even when we contrast the fast-growing -emerging economies‖ of China and India with the rich world, the gap in the first decade of the 21 st century is greater than it was around 1850.
To keep to the comparison from the 1850s, consider the GDP per capita of the United Kingdom China is 5 to 1 today while in 1850 it was (as we have seen above) less than 4 to 1.
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Indeed, the number of countries today is much greater than it was some 160 years ago, and it may seem that this factor alone would lead us to conclude that inter-country income differences, and the gap between the top and the bottom, must have widened anyway. But the widening is not an artifact of the number of countries. We can see this if we limit our observations to the same 63 countries as included by Maddison in 1870, 14 and whose populations 11 In 1990 international prices. We leave out some outliers, small oil-producing economies and Luxemburg, with even higher incomes. Moreover, the very logic of widening income disparities alluded to before shows that the effect of the number of countries cannot be decisive. Because the logic is that some people, living in specific geographical locations, earn today approximately the same-very low--level of income as their ancestors did more than a century and a half ago, while other people, at other locations, live at income levels that are manifold greater than in the past and some 100 times above the subsistence. Thus, the ratio between top and bottom must rise, almost regardless of how we decide to -slice‖ the population of the world (that is, in how many countries they live).
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We obtain the same conclusion if we compare real wages in rich and poor countries. Table 1 shows wages for three occupations in five selected countries (or rather their major cities): two rich (London and New York) and three poor (Beijing, Delhi and Nairobi). The data refer to after-tax nominal wages which are then deflated by the food cost of living in the same cities to obtain real food wages. The advantage of these data, collected for 74 cities and 14 occupations and published by Union de Banques Suisses, UBS (2009), is their almost full comparability. In effect, the wage data refer to net wages earned by the same, very narrowly defined, professions (see Notes to Table 1 ); they are adjusted for the effective number of hours worked, and are geographically limited to large cities for which UBS publication also calculates a food cost of living index.
In Table 1 , I have selected three occupations with increasing level of skills: building laborer, skilled industrial worker, and engineer. The real wage gaps are the greatest in the case of unskilled workers: for them, the ratio of real wages in rich and poor countries is almost 11 to 1. 15 The caveat -almost‖ is necessary because in the extreme case, when the world population were divided into (say) two countries and in such a way that each half would contain the same proportion of locations that have not seen any progress since 1850 and locations that are today much richer, the gap between these two halves need not be greater, and may be smaller, than it was in 1850. But obviously, this is an extreme case which has nothing in common with the real processes of state-formation and real state of affairs both now and in the past.
For the skilled industrial workers and engineers, the gaps are respectively 5.8 to 1 and 3.3 to 1.
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If we contrast this result with the estimates of the ratio between wheat wages of English and Indian unskilled laborers around 1850 (Broadberry and Gupta, 2006 , quoted above), we note that the UK/India unskilled wage gap has increased from around 3.3 to 1 in 1850 to more than 9 to 1 today. The advantage of this particular comparison is that it keeps the level of skills constant across time, and focuses on the very low skills representative of those who are at the bottom of the income pyramid.
It is the gap between the poorest members of rich and poor societies that we found to be the widest, both in income and wage data. Or, to translate this finding in terms of political economy, the commonality of interests between the poor and unskilled workers in the rich world and the poor and unskilled workers in the poor world is hard to detect if we focus on their economic conditions only. This is of course a major departure from a situation which existed a century and a half ago. 16 A decreasing rich-poor country wage gap with greater skills of workers is also found by Warner (2002) . Warner attributes it to greater global competition which exists for more skilled workers whose wages reflect international conditions while the wages of low-skilled workers behave like non-tradables. It can also be explained by greater relative scarcity of more skilled workers in poorer countries. 
From -permanent revolution‖ to -fortresses Europe and America‖
The fact that the position of the poorest members of different societies is vastly different---the fact, for example, that the poorest 5% of Americans, adjusted for price levels, earn 35 times more than the poorest Zambians or 12 times more than the poorest Malians-has global political implications. We have seen above that the entire construct of workers' (poorest people) solidarity was based on some objective conditions, that is on similarity in their living conditions.
But if that similarity in living and working conditions has evaporated, would not the commonality of interests and -class solidarity‖ similarly vanish? And indeed it is not easy to find any examples of shared interests between the poorest classes in rich countries and poorest classes in poor countries. More likely, their interests conflict.
A second implication of the world where location determines to a large extent one's income is that it must be a world of huge migratory pressures because people can increase their incomes severalfold if they migrate from a low mean-income location to a high mean-income location. Only if knowledge of these income differences could be somehow hidden, and not widely-shared, could we expect that people would not want to migrate. But this is most patently not so in the era of globalization, instant communication, and broad access to TV, movies and
Internet.
These two factors thus shape the key global political issues. While in the years between the heady days of the pan-European -Springtime of peoples‖ in 1848, and probably the secondhalf of the 20 th century, the conflict between capital and labor was the main political issue that influenced several generations of thinkers, politicians, social activists, and ordinary people, this is no longer the case today. Globally, the issue has receded in importance as the objective conditions that gave rise to it have changed. This was already even if dimly becoming apparent in the last decades of the 19 th century when the term -workers' aristocracy‖, denoting this divergence of living conditions among the -exploited‖ classes internationally, was coined. To quote Engels again-but now ten years after The Communist Manifesto: ‖…the English proletariat is actually becoming more and more bourgeois. The bourgeoisies of the western world needed no longer fear proletarian revolutions spreading from one country to another. The fact that in 1968, during another pan-European uprising, superficially similar to that 120 years earlier, workers' organizations in the most -revolutionary‖ country (France) were the last to join the protest, unable to formulate any coherent demands, and in fact never made any moves towards the abolition of capitalist relations of production, showed very clearly that the times had changed. The specter of Communism, eloquently evoked by Marx and Engels in the opening sentences of the Communist Manifesto, was exorcised.
The new problem which is likely to dominate the present century is different: it is the problem of uneven development between the countries and, associated with it, the pressure of migration emanating from poor countries. It is no less complicated problem than the earlier one, and involves similar fears of loss of power and income among those who are richer. It is a problem born out of importance of location for one's lifetime earnings no less than the earlier fear of Communist revolution was born out of income differences between the social classes within the same societies. But the development of many poor parts of the globe, even if it were more successful than during the last 60 years, would still take a long time to bring their average incomes to anything close to the incomes in the rich world. Thus migration will remain, by its sheer human importance, the key mechanism whereby incomes of the poor people in the world are to be raised. Faster development of poor countries and migration are two complementary, and in many ways very similar, mechanisms. In both cases, the end result is increase in income of the poor. In one case, the increase is achieved in the place where they live now; in the other case, it necessitates their movement to a different locale. 18 The process moreover is hardly new: in terms of relative importance, migration was much more significant at the end of would yield severalfold more, in net welfare gains terms, than the current development aid.
Migration restrictions are, they argue, more costly than the existing restrictions on trade. In a recent study of the effects of migration in Spain, Bruquetas Callejo and Moreno Fuentes (2011) find that the immigration surge that has, in less than two decades, transformed the country from an emigrant nation to one where foreigners account for 12% of the resident population, has benefited Spain.
21 Pritchett (2006, p.95) criticizes economists who, while acknowledging that both trade and migration are welfare-enhancing, tend to treat them very differently. They argue for trade liberalization on general welfare grounds, and then, in a second step, address income distribution concerns of those who are affected through redistribution. But they never use the same approach 20 when it comes to migration: the equivalence would imply being in favor of migration as a default position, and mitigating its negative effects through specific additional policies.
That from the global perspective migration should be desirable leaves very little doubt, even when we think of it using the simplest economic principles: if people are allowed to move where they think they would do better, it is very likely that total output would increase compared to the situation when people are not allowed to move. For if the reverse were the case, impediments to migration similar to the ones that currently exist at the international level would be found useful and imposed at the national level as well. As Frenkel (1942, p. 183) writes, -The movement of men and women from areas where they are poverty-stricken to areas where they can make their full contribution to the world's income stream is of advantage to all‖.
While the desirability of both increased aid and greater migration may be established in principle and for the world as a whole, it does not mean that it would be to the advantage of each particular country, or particular sections of population in each country. Greater migration may be associated with reduced wages or increased unemployment for the groups of people whose skills are most similar to the skills of migrants. Thus even if for the recipient country as a whole migration is advantageous, sufficiently powerful economic and political groups may be able to block it or impose tough limits on it. Yet, as nicely put by Hanson (2010, p. 22) , -in considering the migration rights that maximize global welfare, one could not argue that US workers be weighted more heavily than both richer [US] employers and poorer migrants‖. Again, going back to the first principles, we can either treat every person in the world as equally important, or we can put a greater weight on the welfare of poorer individuals because of diminishing marginal utility of income but we cannot (logically) pick and choose one group as such in preference to others.
Perhaps more importantly, greater migration faces non-economic obstacles that can be vaguely described as belonging to the area of social acceptance of migrants and their effects on domestic culture. These issues have been exacerbated by the current economic crisis and the unexpectedly great difficulties that many European countries have had in -absorbing‖ migrants, particularly those with Islamic background. Thus, in a close succession, both British and German
Prime Ministers have declared the -multiculaturalist‖ model, which was supposed to be Europe's answer to migration, to have failed. Angela Merkel, moreover, pronounced such a model unambiguously -dead‖. These problems hold particular poignancy for Europe because it is, due to its low fertility rates, much more in need of migrants than the United States. Moreover, in its southern fringes, Europe is surrounded by countries whose demographic profiles are exactly the opposite of the European: these are countries with a very large share of young population and relatively few older people. Were it not mostly for non-economic reasons, the demographic match between the two shores of the Mediterranean would seem almost perfect. However, Europe which has, at least since the end of the 15 th century, -exported‖ its people elsewhere has a serious difficulty viewing itself as an immigrant continent and accepting migrants who mostly come from the areas that were formerly colonized by the Europeans. This reversal of migration flows seems politically difficult to manage.
From the facts that (i) most of today's global income inequality is due to differences in mean incomes between the countries, (ii) in an era of globalization such differences are wellknown to people in poor countries, and (iii) the costs of moving from one place to another are not prohibitive, it follows that migration, in the absence of significant acceleration of growth in poor countries, will be a great 21 st century mechanism of -adjustment‖. It will be driven by the self-interest of individuals but its ultimate result would be a reduction in global inequality and global poverty. Aid and migration ought to be regarded as two complementary means for achieving these goals. Policy makers in developed countries shall come to realize that either poor people will become richer in their own countries or they will migrate to the rich countries.
